Critical Analysis 8: Ch 4 & 5

The Wrong Conclusion on Comparative Advantage

Comparative advantage allowed all counties to effectively communicate and trade with each other, yet Raul Prebisch and Vijay Prashad find fault with this notion. Prebish’s essay, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” and Vjay Prashad’s “Buenos Aires” chapter of The Darker Nations a People’s History of the Third World elude to how the First World powers, Western Europe and the United States of America, dominated Third World companions with furious power. Prebisch and Prashad all fail to recognize the ability of the First World’s ability to generate capital and social progress in foreign territory.

The United States was a savior to the Third World and the post World War II-ravaged Europe, not the power-hungry barbarians of which it has been depicted in Prebisch’s essay and Prashad’s book. The country was considered a poor example of how the Third World should conduct itself when H.W. Stinger and Prashad (paraphrasing) say,

“…the establishment economists in the Unites states and Europe as well as their leading politicians saw the development economists and the leaders of the Third World as ‘Irresponsible wild men, radical utopians who should at most be entrusted with minor extension and offshoots’ of policy already decided by the First World-dominated institutions” (Prashad 64).

Stinger neglects to fully recognize the accomplishments of the United States. Without its ability to create industry, let alone generate capital in foreign markets, Europe might not have truly recovered nor would the Third World have a solid model of a country to emulate. Europe, after a $13 billion investment, managed to completely recover its finances after the war and even, in some cases, had more money before WWII even began (65). The comment truly insults the accomplishments of the United States’ generousity.

Prebisch argues that the darker nations have been ravaged by the colonialism of the First World and are now impoverished (66). Really, it is the responsibility of the leaders of the darker nations to improve their respective economies even during harsh circumstances. For example, Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir has the distinction of organizing a military coup and overthrowing his own government to achieve power, supports radical Islam, has done virtually nothing to fix Sudan’s years-long Civil War, and has several refugees displaced due to the Darfur conflicts (“Profile: Sudan's President Bashir”). His actions have absolutely nothing to do with neither colonialism nor the capitalist tactics of the United States; he is just an irresponsible leader.

Also, Third World companies needed to learn how to better utilize their raw materials and distribute their finished products in the 1940s (Prashad 65). The United States and Europe tried to solve this by using a system of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage means that a country should specialize in producing what it can best produce and then distribute accordingly (67). Prashad states that Prebisch’s main argument is, “The theory of comparative advantage… stifles genuine economic development. And further, since modernization theory promotes the view that national income and investment capital must be raised form the export of raw materials, it will only entrap the new nations more deeply” (67). Prebisch believed that the other countries were being short-changed by the First World nations. The British and The United States should not be faulted for poor trading, but rather for making an attempt to provide other less fortunate nations with solid economic opportunity. Even Prashad notices that Prebisch contradicts himself when he says, “From his experience and studies, Prebisch concluded that the new nations needed to move from production of raw materials to that of manufactured goods” (65). Prebisch offers no alternative solution to comparative advantage. In contrast to Prebisch theory, thanks to comparative advantage, Niger, a troubled Third World country, is the world’s largest exporter of Uranium.

The Second World nations, the Soviet Union and China, also used similar trade tactics. Because they did not have access to the massive financial armory at the disposal of the far richer First World, The USSR and China adopted a socialist stance with various Third World countries (72). The Soviet Union could not produce new necessary products for a high demand Third World. To alleviate the demand, Prashad says, “[Great Brittain] would then ship these rusty machines to India as new and update their own physical plants in the British Isles. Indian industry, the, paid for some of the refurbished British physical plants in the 1950s. Such fraud occurred along the grain of import substitution (73). This was not fraud, this was smart business. India needed supplies and could not supply it for themselves. It was not the job of British to give the best equipment possible, all India needed to do was refurbish the equipment. Prashad seems rather critical of a charitable gesture.

Prebisch said, “We thought that an acceleration of the rate of growth would solve all problems. This was our great mistake. What was needed alongside growth were ‘changes in social structure,’ indeed a “complete social transformation” (73). Prebisch shows that he was completely oblivious his own answer: Capitalism works. Prebisch should have put aside his Marxist values and realized that capitalism has enhanced the overall economy and, as long as all parties fully participated, made the world function on the same playing field. Prebisch even states he might have even endorsed capitalism when Preshad analyzes, “This [Prebischian theory] did not mean that every region should produce everything for itself and therefore live in a state of pure autarky. On the contrary, trade is crucial because some regions have smaller markets than others, and raw materials and agricultural lands are not evenly distributed along national lines” (67). Ultimately, both authors contradict each other and inadvertently acknowledge the accomplishments of the First World’s effect on the Third World.

Works Cited

"BBC NEWS Africa Profile: Sudan's President Bashir." News.Bbc.Co.Uk. 25 Nov. 2003. BBC News. 22 Jan. 2008 .

Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations a People’s History of the Third World. New York City: The New P, 2007. 62-74.

Crtical Analysis 7: Darker Nations: Brussels and Bandung

Bandung: Unity in a Common Enemy

The following paper does not aim to discredit the positive effects of the Bandung Conference on the Third World. Granted, it united nations from across the globe to unify in once common goal: to find a common, unbiased, First World-free voice. That being said, it also was arguably the other half of creating the world’s negative perception of the capitalist system, the hated bourgeoisie. The author of The Darker Nations a People’s History of the Third World, Vijay Prashad, argues in his “Bandung” chapter that the Bandung Conference gave people hope for an optimistic future free of colonialism. Prashad however has a Marxist/communist bias. Prashad says that the Bandung Conference was the unity of the Third World via anti-colonialism, but this is really a guise for pushing a pro-communist agenda. Vijay Prashad's love of communism and unity in Bandung blinds him from realizing the social damage that anti-colonialism sentiment and the conception of the First World as a common enemy has done to the world.

The Bandung Conference was driven primarily by the optimistic Indonesian president, Sukarno. He fervently said,

Irresistible forces have swept the two continents. The mental, spiritual and political face of the whole world has been changed and the process is still not complete. There are new conditions, new concepts, new problems, new ideals abroad in the world. Hurricanes of national awakening and reawakening have swept over the land, shaking it, changing it, changing it for the better (Sukarno 33).

Sukarno’s driven voice resonated with the rest of the Third World’s universal contempt of impact of American and European colonialism and imperialism. Prashad says that even though the countries in the Third World each had separate situations, this “common platform” of unity could undermine the social differences to create a more amalgamated world (Prashad 34). This all seemed like it would lead the world into a new era of peace, but it really brought upon a new layer of prejudice. Sakurno urged all countries attending the conference to stand up against imperialism, not to stand up against prejudices (34). Although Sakurno succeeded in uniting a divided part of the world, he did so by finding a common enemy: the First World. Prashad presents the two sides as the classic David and Goliath tale. Sakurno formed the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) to further the goals of the middle class. Even though he was arrested for extremist actions, his followers, to Prashads own admission, “…backed him despite their shallow knowledge of his program, and he won” (36). This shows that the country was so fueled by disdain, that it back up its leader for the sake of winning an argument.

On a general scale, the Bandung conference, to its credit, created a model that U.N. stove to emulate (49). It was, after all, the first meeting to unite various regions peacefully in one room. However, Bandung specifically united under the post WWII era where the world needed restructure, and there was a certain amount of resistance from the nations that attended the conference. Philipeno Carlos Romulo expressed contempt for the U.S. Marshall Plan after attending this peace conference. [1] Prashad says, “…He used [various] forums to offer a stern rebuke of U.S. economic policy. There is a Marshall Plan for Europe, he told his audience…, but only ‘chicken feed’ for Asia” (39). Romulo said, “What is worse…it comes with the accompaniment of senatorial lectures on how we must be grateful and how imperative it is for us to realize the advantages of the American way of life. And so on. Must Asia and Africa be content with crumbs and must we be told what a great favor is being conferred on us?” (Romulo 39). The Bandung Conference instilled a hatred of the United States in this man as opposed to the message of peace that it aimed to impart. The odd root of Romulo’s hatred for wanting to help needy countries can only be traced back to the negative sentiment of the Bandung Conference.

The U.S. should not be exonerated for their allegedly terrible deeds—after all, two halves make a whole of a problem. After the conference, the U.S. tried to take a new stance of “neutralism” of maintain a somewhat of a calm (48). Prashad says, “The U.S. government, it noted, should ‘respect each country’s choice of national policy for preserving its independence, but make every effort to demonstrate the advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the Free World, as well as the dangers of alignment with the Communist bloc’” (48). The nations that attended the Bandung conference were quite hostile towards U.S. congressperson Adam Clayton Powell Jr. The State department predicted that the close-mindedness of the conference. Powell, an African American, explained, “This conference is not anti-white…but it was anti-American policy and it become an anti-white movement” (Powell 47). Powell was part of a minority, and his timely comments about reverse-racism captured the unwillingness for the nations at the Bandung Conference to change their ways. Prashad defends the nations and says that U.S. was the hostile party, yet does not back up his statement throughout the rest of the chapter (Prashad 47).

Prashad pushes that the Bandung conference impacted the world because of its peace message and wanting to stand against colonialism. In the unstable time post-WWII, the sentiment appears as anti-American, anti-American people, anti-European, and anti-colonial. The conference was counter productive: The U.S. Marshall plan was build to allocate funds to needy countries like the ones in the conference’s attendance, yet they resisted due to negative preconceived notions. Prashad’s pro-communist beliefs blind him to see the negative sentiment from that conference as a peace session.

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[1] [1] The Marshall plan allocated funds to counties in economic need after World War II.

Critical Anlysis 6: Darker Nations Intro and Chp. 1

Why The Term “Third World” is No Longer Relevant

Vijay Prashad’s book, “The Darker Nations a People’s History of the Third World,” is based on rather antiquated phrase: the “Third World.” The term is used to describe countries of less than fortunate circumstances. Some countries that some consider to be apart of this category are Uganda, Ghana, and South Korea. To its credit, the term provides for an easy way to group several countries together in one easily identifiable category. However, the term’s strength is its own weakness: the term lumps together several unrelated countries with the most basic commonality with an obvious Western bias. What constitutes that the Western powers should be the First World and not the Second or Third World? The article that popularized the term the “Third World” is admittedly Western-centric. The names of each “World” had in fact become obsolete and limited each country to a mere label. At best, the Third World denotes geographical location, not as rating of power like it used to define. This is not argument against Prashad’s well-researched historical facts, but rather his context. Prashad wrongfully perpetuates this term and, by doing so, fails to recognize the accomplishments of all of these Third World countries.

The origin of the World terms originated in 1952, after the ending of World War II and around the time the Cold War began. The United States and the Soviet Union were judged as equals during that time, but the media needed to account for the other two billion people were seen by the more economically stable countries of the world as poor, overly fecund, profligate, and worthless (8). Former French resistance fighter turned journalist Albert Sauvy wrote in “L’Observateur” about how the world is divided into the First, Second, and Third Worlds respectively (6). Naturally, his readers all understood the term and knew what category they fit into (7). The First World consisted of The United States and Western Europe, states that embraced capitalism; the Second World was comprised of the USSR, countries that preferred communism, and the Third World accounts for the rest of the World. Prashad explains, “Sauvy used the term Third World in a manner that resonated with how that part of the planet had already begun to act” (10). During this Cold War era, these terms were acceptable and adequate descriptions of various countries.

That being said, things have changed since the 1950s. The First and Second Worlds only account for one third of the world’s population. The Third World has grown into its own entity that operates mostly independently from Western influence. (Many Third World countries were smaller colonies of their larger First or Second World counterparts.) Nigeria, a Third World country, is the 13th largest oil producer in the world and supplies most of the Shell Company’s petroleum reserves (Falola and Genova 196). Saudi Arabia has the largest export and production rankings of oil in the entire world (221). The value of Venezuelan currency inflated 18.6 percent late last year (Ellsworth). These non-First World countries now have certain powers and products that even Western powers such as the United States of America or England emulate. The U.S. does no posses enough oil for its own citizens unless it uses foreign exports and the value of its dollar has gone down drastically. So why is it still apart of the First World?

In 1946 after World War II, England suffered its worst winter and its economy was broken. Similarly, Japan was also in a state needing to be rebuilt. The only difference between these two countries is a label: England is apart of the First World and Japan is apart of the Third World solely due to geographical differences. In the age of the internet and even well-labeled maps, the world no longer needs a label to explain geographical differences.

Many of those who complain about the term’s homogenization for the distinct histories of different regions are on point. The conservative economist Lord Peter T. Bauer rejected the term Third World in his 1981 book of essays because he felt that it treated the world as a “uniform and stagnant mass devoid of distinctive character” and that it denied “those individuals and societies which comprise the Third World of their identity, character, personality and responsibility” (Prashad 12). By 1981, the Western powers and the Soviet Union had long let go of their colonies. Prashad, however, retorts that Bauer entirely misconstrues Sauvy’s term and that it is “an act of artifice for a global social movement that had only a short history behind it” (13). Prashad however forgets to take time period into account. The world in which Prashad has written this book is no longer a world where yellow journalism is prevalent, nor does the Soviet Union still exist, and the Cold War has ended. Prashad’s main point, like his hero Sauvy, is completely antiquated.

Ultimately, the term “Third World” has not stood the test of time. Prashad says, “The Third World project (the ideology and institutions) enabled the powerless to hold a dialogue with the powerful, and try to hold them accountable. Today, there is no such vehicle for local dreams” (xviii). This is true in the sense that it gave attention to the Darker Nations that did not have a voice. Now, these nations—a though they generally face civil war and poverty daily—still have a voice of independence and make their own decisions (albeit poorly). Perhaps Prashad needs to cease his search for a “vehicle for local dreams” and further contemplate his philosophy on the Darker Nations.

Works Cited

Ellsworth, Brian. "REFILE-Venezuela Cuts Three Zeros Off Bolivar Currency." Reuters 1 Jan. 2008. 20 Jan. 2008 .

Falola, Toyin, and Ann Genova. The Politics of the Global Oil Industry. Westport: Praiger, 2005. 196-222.

Prashad, Vijay. The Darker Nations a People's History of the Third World. New York: The New P, 2007. xvii-15.

Critical Analysis 5

The Emulation of European Power

As demonstrated throughout the “World and The West” by Phillip Curtin, European power reigned supreme. What can be denoted in the text is how the nations feared the idea of being ruled by a European power. Nations had fallen or converted their ideals, government, and religion, oftentimes unsuccessfully, in order to avoid total annihilation. In contrast to the rest of the book, Curtin discusses how progressive modernization profited other countries, namely Japan and the Ottoman Empire (depending on one’s definition of success), without having any negative aspects from avoiding a Western power. That being said, in order for there to be a successful transition, these nations had only one difference with their less successful counterparts: Japan and the Ottoman Empire willingly sacrificed their cultures for gain.

From a historical standpoint, the Ottoman Empire being deemed a success could be countered by the simple point that it was eventually destroyed. In that sense, yes, it failed as a nation, but it did resist Western conquest. Borrowing ideas from European powers would at first benefit the Ottoman Empire, and would ultimately advance it as a nation, but not it the way it would have hoped. Ottoman Empire at first resisted missionaries that were apart of the European Christian Church. In fact, the Ottoman Empire was noted for having a high tolerance of other religions and not pushing religion on its citizens (178). However, this later contributed to a nation-wide identity crisis. Several groups of power were forced to accept European aid or asked for it in order to benefit economically and to increase government productivity (181). Eventually, the Ottoman Empire maintained its independence by modeling after, but not associating itself with the European structure of government. This gives perfect motive for why the Young Turks staged a military coup: The Turks themselves were pro-European nationalization, so they figured that The Ottoman Empire should simply convert their views altogether. Curtin states, “Why westernize the outward appearance of government, unless you intend to Westernize the reality as well?” (167).

This effectively destroyed the empire, effectively forming Turkey. Hence, Christianity would also finally spread prominently throughout the new nation (184). The viewpoint of having Christianity and nationalism appealed too much to this renegade group in order let their more antiquated government merely venerate these new ideas as opposed to embody them. The Ottoman Empire venerated European power so much that it collapsed itself by not borrowing enough from its ideals, such as nationalism.

According to Curtin, “Japan is the first and most successful non-Western nation to achieve the high production and consumption pioneered by the West.” Japan itself borrowed heavily form the military side of the European powers. During the Tokugawa Shogunate, as a testament to the all encompassing power of Europe, the military was a dictatorship. The Supreme military commander was such a high ranking position during that time that it was second to Emperor (158). This rendered the originally deity-like status of the Emperor to a mere ceremonial position.

Also, the Meiji Restoration period, Japanese industries were increased due to a renewed sense of military tactics. The Japanese were known for their swords, the honorable samurai. They swapped out these ideas of nobility in order to build guns and ships in order to compete as a viable competitor to the Japanese economy and military (166). The obvious underlying reason for this change in product line was to counter European and to an extent, American forces.

The final shift of Japan was to solidify the Japanese government as an oligarchy. The government created a new constitution that was based on Western ideals and status structures (170). Until World War II, Japan had a relatively solid relationship with Western powers. Curtin best describes the Japanese Western Modernization when he says that “…Japanese traditions continued, incorporating Japanese values and beliefs about appropriate political behavior. The Western models, when used, were also reinterpreted to make them ore congenial to Japanese culture. The result was not a Westernizing of Japanese political life, nor an unchanging continuation of earlier Japanese norms, but a series of new responses to changing conditions” (171). This caused a high shift economics by accidentally mimicking European fear tactics.

The Ottoman Empire and Japan were both similar in the sense that they maintain several core values and tradition throughout their modernization, Religion and the maintenance of the Emperor position respectively. These originals thoughts, however, were merely shells of what they used to be. The Ottoman Empire collapsed within itself because it did modernize, but the Young Turks wanted to see their nation become a clone of Europe instead of see a nation that compromised its ideals. These nations did take note of European efficiency, but they mostly took power into consideration when emulating them.

Critical Analysis 4

Defensive Modernization: Creating and Destroying Modern Nations

Defensive modernization has a double meaning. The first meaning is that a nation westernized its ways in order to better fit into a modern society by using nearby resources. For example, nations may have utilize agricultural techniques in order to better utilize its food supply or advance its military to better suit its government’s agenda. However, defensive modernization’s second definition means that a nation sacrifices its culture for the sake of economic and wartime survival, depending on the reaction from its citizens. This is called diffusion (Curtin 132). That being said, when a nation, however, decides to ignore a known resource for some time, it still keeps its culture (for the time being). This is called nondiffusion (134). Curtin alludes to how various countries have modernized at the expense of their cultures. A nation can either diffuse to better fit into modern society and lose its identity or not diffuse and maintain its cultural heritage, but fall behind economically. Defensive modernization creates a never-ending circle of cultural sacrifice for the sake of keeping up with trends.

Proselytizing Christians trying to modernize foreign nations could be construed as a form of diffusion. After all, most westernized, prosperous nations practice Christianity. Curtin says, “The Christian missionaries in the past century and a half were inevitably intertwined with the Europeans conquests of that same period. The Christian message often appeared simultaneously with the victory of the Western military and the establishment of European empires” (111). These Christians missionaries were giving the foreign nations the choice if they wanted to be apart of the winning team; the Christian, Western team. As exemplified in Chapter 7, the kingdom of Buganda converted to Christians and gained access to valuable worldly tools such as literature, higher social status, and common spirituality (124). In contrast, African “outsiders” did not benefit the same way the Ganda did after it converted. Several East African nations are still behind economically (not to say Buganda is much better). Additionally, Buganda furthered its transformation when its ruler, Muteska I acquired guns (117). Guns made the Ganda a viable threat to its neighbors and the rising Muslim population. Buganda learned how to leverage in bartering with ivory and slaves (121). In fact, the British even invested in the territory with a railroad because Uganda had the aforementioned resources that Britain didn’t possess. As exemplified by the Neo-Inc resistance, defensive modernization and Christian proselytizing occur happens when a nation is at its most dire state. As Curtin explains, “It was a reaction among members of a society already defeated by alien conquerors” (137). Peru managed to hold off Spain using European military techniques with considerably less manpower. However, this led to the adaptation of the Spanish religion and culture. Initial resistance to a new power inadvertently leads to its ultimate acceptance.

Another example of defensive modernization is Hawaii during the late 18^th century; Hawaiin emperor Kamehameha bought some artillery in order to better combat wartime enemies and proved to be a viable competitor against European nations (144). The people loved him for his efforts to make Hawaii stronger and his Europe lauded him for using a foreign resource and modifying it with a cultural item. (He equipped his ancient canoes with state of the art weaponry (144)). Gradually, Hawaii would later combat various nations in their attempts to annex Hawaii. The Kamameha lineage fought off the nations, but in doing so, would gradually diffuse its culture with every experience (144). If a government, military, or other various threats would appear, Hawaii would mirror its opponents’ resource in defensive; in return, Hawaii lost parts of its Polynesian culture each time. Eventually, Hawaii’s monarchial government became modernized in the form of democracy (147). Its Polynesian roots are unrecognizable (148). In a matter of two and a half centuries, Hawaii changed from a tribal society into 50^th state of the United States of America: It ultimately became what it fought against.

Siam did westernize, not under-pressure, but by evolution. In the 1800s, King Mongkut noted Western Europe as a potential threat and began to modernize its military. King Chulalongkorn furthered his father King Mongkut’s vision by uniting his people with a new government structure based on Western structure (151). He also improved taxing procedures and public education in order to compete with France and the Malay states and removed Buddhism’s influence from its government, effectively separating church and state (153). The largest change in Siam’s structure was in its military power because of the power of self-defense that it granted. Siam did not become susceptible to the likes of the BEIC or the VOC. This proves that Westernization doesn’t need to have pressure to work, but it is in fact the natural evolution of a nation. By trying so hard not to diffuse, it naturally did so.

Defensive modernization has helped smaller nations stand up to larger Western powers; then, the smaller nations eventually let that small taste of westernization override its sense of national pride and culture. The nation then becomes a smaller version of that larger nation or later sides with it. However, by not diffusing, the nation is at the mercy of the larger nation. Therefore, defensive modernization creates a necessary, never-ending cycle for the survival that at first helps, but ultimately hurts that nation.

Critical Analysis 3

Less is More: Chapter Four's Cautionary Tale

The first two chapters in Part Two of Curtin’s book, “The World and The West,” rendered a mixed bag of results with chapter five being the victor over the incoherent chapter four. Both chapters tried to concentrate on pluralism, colonialism, and demography. Chapter four suffered from a non cohesive theme, or rather, it stretched too far for a common route between central Asia and South Africa. Chapter five on the other hand was a perfect example of pluralism that is perfectly synergized for all nations. Chapter four stretched continental boundaries and overcomplicated itself while chapter give stayed within Latin America to successfully prove its point.

Chapter four, “Culture Change in Plural Societies: South Africa and Central Asia,” attempted to prove that these tow nations shared similar statistics in demography and geography and themes of mixed ethnicity, forced servitude, expansion, and European migration (Curtin 59). Curtin fails to establish these clear connections between the aforementioned ideas; therefore, Curtin does no succeed in this endeavor. For example, in his chapter he should be talking about his two main subjects, South Africa and Central Asia, but instead he begins with South American countries like Mexico and Chile for extraneous anecdotes (57). The reader couldn’t possibly tell which direction this chapter is going. He/ she can’t tell if Curtin will talk about South Africa and Central Asia or Latin America. (Curtin does discuss Mexico in further detail in chapter five.) After going off on several disconnected tangents, Curtin finally discusses South Africa and Central Asia’s common routes in demography and their respective European influences (63). Europe established pluralism in both nations: South Africa’s population was influenced by Belgium; additionally English setters resided on the Eastern Cape, Natal, and nearby cities with great economic development (60). Central Asia had a similar experience in the now deserted Slavic nations (61). The other common links rely within religion and similarly shaped geography, but that seems a bit like a stretch.

The core of the matter is that despite their similarities, South Africa and Central Asia cannot be compared together because of geographical differences; these two areas are separated by the ocean. The idea that both areas are connected because they have the aforementioned similarities is a faulty thesis; just because they have a few things in common doesn’t mean that they are alike. Central Asia has shifted drastically due to the former Soviet Union’s destitute economic policies and South Africa still is dealing with governmental woes. To put such general concepts together to prove a point is reckless for someone of Curtin’s stature.
Luckily, he redeems himself with his next chapter because Curtin keeps it simple. He talks solely about Mexican culture and how it has been influenced by European nations and religions (71). The Mayan nation adapted to Spain’s cultural influences then revolted due to their distain for Spain’s unnecessary presence. Similarly, the Yaqui were influenced by Jesuits and adopted that style. They too revolted because they wanted their own government (89). The chapter closes with the Caste War and its negative economic effect on the Mexican culture (87). It then subtly transitions into an explanations of how in the 20th to mid 21st century, Mexico finally found its culture or rather became comfortable in its mixture of Indian and European influences (90). Curtin writes about a clear topic with natural progression in this chapter.

This may not seem much different from chapter four’s reasons why South Africa and Central Asia are similar, but chapter five simplifies it. By concentrating primarily on Mexican nations and the European nations, a clearer, more obvious point becomes apparent. In chapter four, Curtin had three nations; by adding that extra nation, Curtin overcomplicated his point; he undermines himself with that extra nation. If South Africa and Central Asia had their own chapters, Curtin would have been able to go into further depth. Instead, he writes in brief about a vague concept with no build or an ending. By taking on that extra subject, he sacrifices his signature structure that graces the reader in the first three chapters. Because of this, the reader is stupefied by the point he is trying to make for the sake of going the extra mile. Perhaps he’ll have better luck on the next chapter. The adage of “more is less” truly applies to chapter four.

Critical Analysis 2

Kosovo’s Independence: Not a Good Idea

Kosovo is being pressured to join NATO and the European Union, but all parties involved in this process will most likely not benefit from this move. Kosovo is apart of Serbia, which already has shown disapproval of Kosovo being recognized as its own nation. The United States politicians disagree where Kosovo’s independence will truly benefit any party involved (Wood). If anything, Serbia will feel alienated, the European Union will have a learning curve in accepting this new nation, the United States won’t benefit from its independence because they can’t allocate enough time towards helping the nation develop, and Kosovo’s economy is far too weak to support itself. It would be a waste of time for Kosovo and all other parties involved to insure the nation’s independence for the sake on maintaining their respective relationships and economies.
This problem started in 1999 when Serbia was still apart of Yugoslavia. NATO ordered an air raid on Serbia to force them to sign a peace treaty; this treaty effectively signified the end of the war and NATO’s offer for Serbia to join (Haney). Velimir Ilic, Serbia’s minister of infrastructure, denounced the rest of Europe due to these actions (Wood). Serbia didn’t fully comply with NATO’s offer because their pride was broken. NATO still demands apologies for Serbia’s numerous war crimes (Wood). The country was bombed and somewhat emasculated; if Kosovo is taken away from them, the rest of Serbia could turn violent.

Aside from Serbia’s discourse, Kosovo wouldn’t be able to support itself due to its poor economy if it were to become independent. Kosovo still has several momentary woes that make it arguably one of the poorest countries in the world. They are very far behind the rest of world in simple necessities such as coal, electricity, oil, and education. 49 percent of the country that has not gone throughout the education system is illiterate. Kosovo relies primarily on its neighbors, Macedonia and Montenegro (“Kosovo Monthly Economic Briefing). Macedonia is Kosovo’s largest importer and exporter of goods. If Kosovo were to declare its independence, Macedonia would most not side with Kosovo even though they have strong economic ties; Macedonia would fear the rest of Serbia.

Furthermore, the United States, one of Kosovo’s primary allies, wouldn’t be able to help it very effectively. The United States is one of Kosovo’s primary advocates, but it is very distracted right now in its own issues with Iraq. The worst case scenario is that Kosovo breaks free from Serbia and they can’t settle peacefully. Serbia, having long-established relations with its neighbors more so than Kosovo, will rage a war against Kosovo. Kosovo doesn’t have the military firearms or the manpower in order to support itself during wartime. Kosovo would try to call upon the United States, but they are in Iraq and wouldn’t be able to lend soldiers to Kosovo for battle. They would then call upon the rest of Europe that would give only limited help because they are also adding the United States. Although this idea may sound implausible, it sounds more realistic than Serbia amicable acknowledging Kosovo’s independence.

If Kosovo cannot sustain itself now under Serbia, then it cannot possible sustain itself if it were an independent nation. Kosovo would be financially busted, burden the world, and risk war. The United States cannot follow up on their promises to help Kosovo because they are too preoccupied and Serbia has too strong of a history of malice towards other nations. Although the concept of a free nation is appealing, Kosovo’s time is not now. Kosovo should accept NATO and the European Union’s offer to become its own nation a few years after Operation Iraqi Freedom is finished in order for the U.S. and the rest of Europe to better accommodate Kosovo’s needs.

Works Cited

"Kosovo Factsheet." Infoplease.Com. 19 June 1999. 23 Sept. 2007 .

"Kosovo Montly Economic Briefing." 23 Sept. 2007 .

Wood, Nicholas. "Serbs See Rift with West If Kosovo Gains Independence." The New York Times 16 Sept. 2007. 16 Sept. 2007 .